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INTERIM RELIEF AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE REMEDIES: A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL CONFUSION
Two 1972 cases, Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
and PepsiCo., Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), provide an
opportunity to explore the confused and often contradictory case law
concerning the proper relationship between the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies and the power of a federal district
court to grant interim relief to maintain the status quo pending a
final administrative decision.
The proper relationship between the judiciary and the quasi-
judicial administrative agency is a topic of continuing controversy in
administrative law. One of the most significant and puzzling problems
which has arisen in this area is the timing of judicial intervention in
the administrative process-at what point and to what extent may
the court give relief to a party aggrieved by administrative action. As
a general rule, a party must exhaust available administrative reme-
dies before judicial relief will be granted.' Universally applied, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes an appli-
cant from challenging the validity of administrative actions prior to
seeking relief via prescribed administrative procedures.2 A differ-
ent, though related, problem arises when a party seeks judicial in-
tervention not to challenge the validity of the agency's action, but
rather merely to maintain the status quo during the administrative
process. Interim relief ordinarily is granted in order to prevent ir-
reparable harm to the party pending the agency's final decision.'
This Note will examine judicial treatment of the exhaustion and
1. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
2. See generally 3 DAvis §§ 20.01-.10; JAFFE 424-58. Professor Davis has
stated: "ETihe most important fact about the federal law of exhaustion is that
the Supreme Court has never attempted to write an opinion integrating its holdings
for and against exhaustion." Davis, Book Review, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 657
(1966).
3. The granting of interim relief pending final administrative action is analo-
gous to the judicial power to preserve the status quo pending judicial review since
each power seeks to ensure that the final determination of the merits will not
be undermined or rendered ineffective by irreparably changed conditions. For a
general discussion of the justification of interim relief, see Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9-11 (1942).
On the issue of interim relief pending an administrative determination on the
merits, see JAFFE 667-72; Note, Interim Injunctive Relief Pending Administrative
Determination, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 1124 (1949).
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interim relief issues, analyze the significance of differentiating between
the two similar and yet quite distinct situations, and attempt to de-
lineate their respective parameters in order to ascertain which doc-
trine, with its attendant tests and remedies, should appropriately be
applied in any particular factual context.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIBS
The Doctrine Defined. A desire for orderly and efficient pro-
cedure4 and an implicit recognition of the requirements of comityu
underlie the exhaustion doctrine. Properly applied, exhaustion per-
forms a function which can be analogized to that performed by fed-
eral judicial statutes which severely limit the availability of interloc-
utory appeals. 6 As a practical matter, premature interruption of the
administrative process often leads to additional delay and expense;
moreover, the disputed issue is frequently rendered moot or insignifi-
cant as a result of the final administrative decision. Considerations
of comity also lie behind the doctrine. Administrative agencies func-
tion as entities quite separate from the judiciary-they are essentially
an arm of the executive branch with legislatively conferred powers
and duties; accordingly, courts are relatively reluctant to interfere
with prescribed administrative procedure in the absence of unusual
circumstances, particularly where the disputed question is one which
is within the agency's special expertise.7 While the doctrine has been
said to be one of discretion,8 arguably its application is mandatory
4. United States v. L.A. Tucker Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1952); Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 232 (1908); 37 U. CN. L. Rnv. 861,
862-63 (1968).
5. See JAFFE 426; Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE
LJ. 981, 984-85 (1939). Cf. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. Duluth St. Ry.,
273 U.S. 625, 628 (1927); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196,
203 (1924); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908).
6. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1970).
7. JAFFE 424-26; Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 39 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 273, 292-93 (1954). See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
194 (1969); Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
8. JAFFE 425. Professors Jaffe and Davis contend the exhaustion doctrine
should be discretionary as to its application, depending upon a balancing of several
factors. See DAvis § 20.03; JAiF 432-37. Supporting this theory, Judge Magruder
has said:
This [exhaustion] doctrine had its origin in a discretionary rule adopted
by courts of equity to the effect that a petitioner will be denied equitable
relief when he has failed to pursue an available administrative remedy
by which he might obtain the same relief. Smith v. United States, 199
F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952) (emphasis added).
For an opposite view, Professor Berger has stated:
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where a statute prescribes a specific administrative procedure, lim-
its the judicial review from such procedure to a specific court, and
denominates such review as "exclusive. ' 9
Consistent with the rationale behind the doctrine, the courts will
not require exhaustion either where the available administrative
remedy would be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury'0 or where
to exhaust the prescribed administrative procedure would be an
exercise in futility." These are not exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement but rather are in accord with it, since the logic which
supports the doctrine presupposes the availability of an adequate
administrative remedy which offers substantial protection of the as-
serted right. Thus, exhaustion is not required where an intermedi-
Judicial relief is today conditioned upon exhaustion of the administrative
remedy largely because courts of equity believed that the presence of that
remedy, like the availability of an adequate remedy at law, defeated equity
jurisdiction. . . . [Tihe logic of the development of the rule demands a
crystallization of its non-discretionary nature in all branches of the doc-
trine. Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, supra note 5, at
1006.
For an analysis of the discretionary-nondiscretionary conflict, see Comment, Ex-
haustion of Administrative Remedies as a Prerequisite to Judicial Review-Dis-
cretionary Treatment by Federal Courts, 44 MIcH. L. Ray. 1035 (1946). The
Supreme Court seems to accept the discretionary theory. See McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
9. See McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders,
28 CtAnc. L. Rav. 129, 151-64 (1940).
10. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
The court did not require exhaustion where the petitioner contended he was being
irreparably injured by agency delay. The court noted that in such a case:
[Tihere is no available administrative remedy. If hearings are held be-
fore a trial examiner pursuant to the second remand order, the plaintiff
will have no right to attack there the propriety of the Board's action in
again remanding the case. Nor will it there have any effective right to
assert its contention that the second remand order and the holding of
extended additional hearings pursuant to it constitute a present denial of its
rights under ... the Administrative Procedure Act. Indeed, the Board
does not here contend that there is any administrative remedy available
to the plaintiff for the protection of the right asserted. It contends only
that the right may be ultimately asserted, after the delay is done, in a
review proceeding. . . . Id. at 866.
But such review, the court held, would be insufficient to protect against the injury
caused by the delay; accordingly, exhaustion was not required.
11. That "futile" exhaustion will not be required is made clear in Williams v.
Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
Where administrative review is certain to be fruitless and is calculated
neither to afford relief nor even to afford a review of the one point at
issue ...failure to pursue administrative remedies should not be a bar
' * l** Id. at 548.
It has been noted that exhaustion does not require parties to be "buffeted from
'pillar to post' in a vain search for a tribunal that can vouchsafe to them their
rights." Randolph v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 85 F. Supp. 846, 847 (W.D.
Mo. 1949), affd, 182 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1950).
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ate agency decision subjects the petitioner to immediate harm which
the prescribed course of administrative review is inadequate to pre-
vent; here it may be said that the petitioner has exhausted all avail-
able remedies vis-a-vis the particular injury asserted. In addition,
where the available administrative remedies are more of form than
substance, the petitioner will not be required to exhaust procedures
which are in fact meaningless.' In sum, exhaustion, where ap-
plicable, is designed to allow the administrative agency to perform
the task delegated to it by the legislature-the application of its spe-
cialized understanding to problems within a specified area-free
from the disruption of judicial intervention in its established proce-
dure. It is based not only on respect of one branch for the integrity
of another, but also on the practical considerations of avoiding ad-
ditional delay and expense by allowing problems to be resolved in an
orderly and efficient manner when the ordinary course of judicial
review will adequately protect the rights of the private parties.
The Doctrine and Its Exceptions. In the leading case of Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,"3 the Supreme Court held that a
district court did not have jurisdiction to determine the applicability
of provisions of the National Labor Relations Act14 to a party which
had been charged with a complaint by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) and was seeking to enjoin a subsequent NLRB
hearing based on the complaint. Bethlehem contended that the pro-
posed action was ultra vires and denied that it was involved in either
interstate or foreign commerce, which was a prerequisite for the
Board's jurisdiction to attach; therefore, jurisdiction lay in the dis-
trict court to enjoin the hearing. In denying the requested relief, the
Court ruled that such judicial intervention would be "at war with the
long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to
12. E.g., Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972). In
Williams, the plaintiffs brought an action in a district court to have a portion of
the Social Security Act which denied certain benefits to illegitimate children de-
clared unconstitutional. The plaintiffs brought suit without waiting for decision by
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare with respect to their pending re-
quest for reconsideration of the administrative ruling terminating their benefits.
Immediate judicial review was granted on the basis that the Secretary was specifi-
cally required by statute to deny plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, there was no
"practical prospect that the statutory administrative review procedure would be
more than an empty formality." Id. at 548.
13. 303 U.S. 41 (1938). For a discussion of Myers, see DAvis § 20.02; JAFFz
433.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1970).
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judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the pre-
scribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."'15
The Myers principle is subject to several important exceptions.
For example, exhaustion was not required in Leedom v. Kyne,16
where the petitioner contended that an order issued by the NLRB
was beyond its statutorily delegated powers. In Leedom, the Su-
preme Court held that the district court did have jurisdiction be-
cause the Board's order was invalid on its face as an attempted exer-
cise of power that was contrary to a specific statutory prohibition.
However, the Leedom exception has been held to be very narrow, en-
compassing only egregious agency errors, such as the assertion of a
power specifically denied by statute. A mere claim of ultra vires
agency action is insufficient to avoid the exhaustion requirement, 17
15. 303 U.S. at 50 (citation omitted). Although the doctrine did not receive
general recognition until the landmark case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211
U.S. 210 (1908), it had been applied by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 168-70 (1904). For earlier federal manifestations of
the doctrine, see Altschul v. Gittings, 86 F. 200 (C.C.D. Ore. 1898); Dundee Mort-
gage Trust Inv. Co. v. Charlton, 32 F. 192 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887).
16. 358 U.S. 184 (1958). The National Labor Relations Act provides that,
in determining the unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes, "the
Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such
unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional
employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in
such unit." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). Having refused to hold an election
among the professional employees of a labor organization to ascertain whether a
majority of them would vote for inclusion in such a unit, the Board included both
professional and nonprofessional employees in the bargaining unit. The profes-
sional employees thereafter brought suit in a district court, asserting that the Board
had exceeded its statutory power by including the professional employees, without
their consent, in a unit with nonprofessionals and asking that the Board's action be
set aside. Id. at 185-86.
17. Leedom v. Kyne represents only a narrow and rarely successfully in-
voked exception to the doctrine that exhaustion of administrative proce-
dures is a condition precedent to federal court jurisdiction. Under this ex-
ception access to the courts is accorded only if the Mediation Board's de-
termination is infused with error which is of a summa or magna quality as
contraposed to decisions which are simply cum error. Only the egregious
error melds the Board's decision into justiciability. Lesser malignancies
thwart the jurisdiction of the courts. United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d
1354, 1368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 962 (1969) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481
(1964); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 402 F.2d
196, 204-05 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968); Modem Plastics
Corp. v. McCulloch, 400 F.2d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1968); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. FTC,
380 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Teamsters Local 690 v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 966 (9th
Cir. 1967); UNA Chapter Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd.,
294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); International
Vol. 1W73:1571
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otherwise exhaustion would not have been required in the landmark
Myers case."
The Supreme Court enunciated another exception to the exhaus-
tion doctrine in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras,"9 where prompt judicial review was given to a challenge of
NLRB jurisdiction, even though no specific statutory prohibition
had been violated by the Board. In McCulloch, the Court permitted
review of an NLRB election order because of international over-
tones involved in the Board's application of the National Labor Re-
lations Act to foreign maritime crews. 20  Exhaustion was not required
because of "the presence of public questions particularly high in the
scale of our national interest because of their international complex-
ion."'21 Thus, McCulloch, although involving an atypical factual
situation, implies that prompt judicial review will be permitted
where agency action raises questions of such a public nature as to
affect significantly the national interest.
A third exception was formulated by the Second Circuit in Fay
v. Douds,22 where a labor union complained that its status as exclu-
sive bargaining agent had been terminated by an NLRB hearing ex-
aminer without benefit of a hearing. Finding that the district court
had jurisdiction to hear the complaint, the Court of Appeals held that
Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 815 (1960).
Professor Davis has offered a proposed guide for determining the applicability
of the exhaustion doctrine to a particular case where the administrative agency's
jurisdiction is challenged. He believes the decision should be reached by a careful
balancing of three factors--"extent of injury from pursuit of administrative remedy,
degree of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and involve-
ment of specialized administrative understanding in the question of jurisdiction."
DAVIs § 20.03, at 69 (citations omitted).
18. Compare Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1938) with Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-89 (1958).
19. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
20. Although the members of the crews of vessels owned by a foreign subsid-
iary of an American corporation were foreign and represented by a foreign union,
id. at 14, the NLRB held that the Act extended to them, and it ordered representa-
tive elections. This assertion of power to determine the representation of foreign
seamen aboard vessels under foreign flags aroused vigorous protests from foreign
governments and created international problems for the Government. See id. at 17.
21. Id. at 17.
22. 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949); accord, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d
755 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
However, this exception has been narrowly construed. See McCulloch v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969); Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1965).
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exhaustion is not required when the petitioner has made a substan-
tial showing that an agency action has violated his constitutional
rights and the assertion of such rights is not "transparently frivo-
lous."
23
INTERIM RELIEF
In theory, the exhaustion doctrine and the doctrine of interim
relief pending administrative action are conceptually distinct and in-
volve different considerations as to their application; however, the
distinction is more difficult to make in practice. In many instances a
judicial failure to draw this distinction will not lead to an improper
result2 4 in that there is a common factor in determining whether
to grant interim relief or whether exhaustion is not required and
review on the merits may be granted-that is, the presence and
extent of irreparable injury. Nevertheless, such cases serve as mis-
leading precedent, thereby further confusing the proper applica-
tion of each of the doctrines.
Interim relief is a proposition quite distinct from the doctrine of
exhaustion. It concerns the propriety of a court exercising its power
to preserve the status quo until the prescribed administrative ac-
tion is completed. The court is not asked to make a binding determi-
nation on the merits of a particular proceeding, but rather to pre-
vent irreparable damage while the administrative decision still remains
pending and uncertain. Thus, when a court insures that the admin-
istrative process will continue without irreparable injury to any of the
parties concerned by granting interim relief, the court is acting not
in derogation of the administrative process, but rather in concert with
it. 2 5
The authority of a court to preserve the status quo by issuing
a temporary injunction pending judicial review of a final agency ac-
tion is well established.20 Section 10(d) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) expressly recognizes this power,27 and the All
23. 172 F.2d at 723.
24. Compare Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954) with Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp.
544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See note 52 infra.
25. See Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871, 875, rehearing denied, 462 F.2d
883 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (opinion rendered), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S.
Mar. 19, 1973).
26. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
27. On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to
prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court, including the court to which
a case may be taken on appeal from or on application for certiorari or
Vol. 1973:157]
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Writs Act2s has been used to justify the issuance of such relief.20
Interim relief has been further justified on the basis of protecting the
court's jurisdiction by preventing the situation from changing ir-
reparably before the court is able to act. 30 The judicial power to
maintain the status quo pending an administrative decision has not,
however, been so uniformly recognized. Some courts have explic-
itly recognized such a power, justifying its use as an equitable tool
to protect jurisdiction."1 But relief is not granted as a matter of
right in either situation, whether pending judicial review or ad-
ministrative action; rather, the propriety of the issuance of the in.
junction is a matter of judicial discretion.12  A four-factor test, first
enunciated in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC,83 is
often utilized to govern issuance or denial of interim relief in both
situations: (1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that he is
likely to prevail on the merits of his appeal? (2) Has the petitioner
shown that without such relief he will be irreparably injured? (3)
Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties in the
proceeding? (4) Would the issuance of a stay further the public in-
terest?3
4
other writ to a reviewing court, may issue all necessary and appropriate
process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve
the status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings. 5
U.S.C. § 705 (1970).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
29. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 n.4 (1942). Tie All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
See also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604-05 (1966); Application of
the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1004-06
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
30. No court can make time stand still. The circumstances surrounding a
controversy may change irrevocably during the pendency of an appeal,
despite anything a court can do. But within these limits it is reasonable
that an appeal court should be able to prevent irreparable injury to the
parties or to the public resulting from the premature enforcement of a de-
termination which may later be found to have been wrong. It has always
been held, therefore, that as part of its traditional equipment for the ad-
ministration of justice, a federal court can stay the enforcement of a judg-
ment. . . . [Sluch judicial review would be an idle ceremony if the situ-
ation were irreparably changed before the correction could be made. 316
U.S. at 9-10.
31. Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schwartz v. Coving-
ton, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
32. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942); Virginia Ry.
Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1926).
33. 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
34. The Virginia Petroleum Jobbers four-factor test has been employed in de-
termining the propriety of granting interim relief pending judicial review. See In re
Vol. 1973:157
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The power of a court to grant interim relief to maintain the
status quo pending a final administrative decision has been denied by
some courts as being contrary to the exhaustion doctrine. Although
most of the comparatively meager case law dealing with interim relief
pending an agency decision is fairly recent, early applications of
such relief may be found in a series of cases involving the issuance of
injunctions to restrain waste prior to the determination of land ti-
ties by an administrative agency.3 5 The first significant federal case
confronting the interim relief issue was Avon Dairy Co. v. Eisaman 6
which involved the issuance of a marketing order by the Secretary
of Agriculture. Avon had petitioned the Secretary for a rehearing
and applied for an interim postponement of the effective date of the
order pending the Secretary's decision. When the requested post-
ponement was denied, Avon, relying upon section 10(d) of the
APA,3 7 sought a stay of the order's effectiveness in the district court.
However, the court interpreted section 10(d) to apply "only when the
final adverse action of the Secretary. . .is pending here on review. '38
Accordingly, the court held that it had no jurisdiction to issue the
stay prior to a denial of administrative rehearing.39 The Avon ap-
proach was also adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Osmond v. Riv-
erdale Manor, Inc.,4" where the plaintiff, while his appeal was pend-
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 457 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1972); Middlewest Motor Freight
Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970); Long v. Robinson, 432
F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1970); Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 395 F.2d 685
(5th Cir. 1968); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 261 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1958). The
test has also been used to grant interim relief pending final administrative action.
See Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schwartz v. Covington,
341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
35. Olive Land & Dev. Co. v. Olmstead, 103 F. 568 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1900);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderburg, 86 F. 49 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1898); Elliott v.
Rich, 24 N.M. 52, 172 P. 194 (1918).
36. 69 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1970). See note 27 supra.
38. 69 F. Supp. at 502.
39. There being no statute making reviewable the denial of the applica-
tion for stay before the Secretary of Agriculture, there would seem to be
no power here to entertain the matters of . . . the preliminary, pro-
cedural, or intermediate action . . . . This may seem harsh and a mod-
em legislative departure from time-honored remedial process in the courts
but the Congress apparently has willed it so by design or unintentional
omission. Id. at 502.
Yet one year later a district court interpreted section 10(d) as authorizing the
grant of interim relief, although the requested relief was denied since there was no
finding of irreparable injury. See Wettre v. Hague, 74 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mass.
1947), rev'd on other grounds, 168 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1948).
40. 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952).
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ing before the Director of Rent Stabilization, sought a stay of rent
reduction orders issued by the Area Rent Director under the Housing
and Rent Act of 1947.41 The appellate court, relying on the ex-
haustion doctrine, held that such relief could not be given. 42  The
significance of the holding lies primarily in the rationale adopted by
the court. The court placed great emphasis on a then-recent Supreme
Court decision, Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch,43
which the Osmond court felt had addressed precisely the same ques-
tion.44 The court stressed that the petitioners in both instances were
seeking judicial intervention after initiation but before completion
of administrative review. The Osmond court apparently felt this was
the determinative aspect of the problem.45 Yet, the court either failed
to recognize or, if it did, attached no significance to the fact that the
type of judicial intervention sought in each of the cases was concep-
tually different. In Aircraft, the petitioner had sought adjudication
on the merits-judicial review prior to exhaustion-while in Osmond
the petitioner had sought only the preservation of the status quo until
41. Ch. 163, 61 Stat. 196.
42. Id. at 80.
43. 331 U.S. 752 (1947). Pursuant to the First and Second Renegotiation Acts,
the Secretary of War and the War Contracts Adjustment Board had determined
that Aircraft had realized excessive profits on certain sub-contracts made with gov-
ernment contractors. Accordingly, it was directed that Aircraft's customers with-
hold and pay into the Treasury such sums due Aircraft equal to the excess profits.
Id. at 757. In accordance with the Acts' review procedure, Aircraft appealed to
the Tax Court. Simultaneously, Aircraft brought an action in the district court ask-
ing for a declaratory judgment that the Renegotiation Acts were unconstitutional
and/or that they did not cover Aircraft's contracts. In addition, Aircraft requested
a permanent injunction against any further action against it under the Acts. Id. at
757-58. The Supreme Court held that the district court was without power to grant
such relief since the prescribed administrative review had been only initiated, not
exhausted. Id. at 771.
44. Osmond v. Riverdale Manor, Inc., 199 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1952).
45. The court noted that "[tihe cases are legion holding that one claiming to
be hurt by an administrative proceeding, where an administrative review is open and
available, cannot, in lieu of, and without resorting to, this administrative review, ap-
peal for relief to the courts." Id. at 77. The court recognized that the question
presented by the case could be distinguished from the above situation. However,
the language and the added italics quoted from the Aircraft case illustrate that the
court felt the distinction lay not in the type of relief sought, but rather in its tim-
ing:
The doctrine [of exhaustion], wherever applicable, does not require
merely the initiation of prescribed administrative procedures. It is one of
exhausting them, that is, of pursuing them to their appropriate conclusion
and correlatively, of awaiting their final outcome before seeking judicial
intervention. Id. at 78, quoting Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch,
331 U.S. 752, 767 (1946).
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administrative review could be completed.46 Reduced to its simplest
terms, the Osmond decision thus stands for the proposition that the
exhaustion doctrine precluded any judicial intervention prior to the
final agency decision.17
However, the Avon-Osmond line of reasoning has not domi-
nated the judicial approach to the problem of interim relief; an al-
ternative line of cases has analyzed the issue in fundamentally differ-
ent terms. Three Second Circuit cases have established the proposi-
tion that a court's traditional equitable powers justify the granting
of interim relief to maintain the status quo in order to prevent ir-
reparable injury while the final administrative decision is pending.
These cases have specifically held that the granting of such relief was
not in contravention of the requirement of exhaustion. 8
The leading case which appears to provide the basis for the doc-
trine of granting interim relief to maintain the status quo pending ad-
ministrative action is West India Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Sea-
train Lines, Inc.49  In that case, the United States Maritime Com-
mission had intervened as a party plaintiff in an action to enjoin a
46. Professor Jaffe has argued that Aircraft not only did not deny the power
of interim relief refused in Osmond, but actually strongly implied the existence of
such power. JAFFE 668-70. He points out, id. at 669, language in a footnote of
the Aircraft opinion which implies the existence of judicial power to grant interim
relief to preserve the status quo pending the administrative decision:
in the event of such action [a suit by Aircraft against its customers
for the money being withheld pursuant to the directives of the Under Sec-
retary of War], the court would have power to preserve, pending the ad-ministrative decision, the status quo and all rights of the appellant. Air-
craft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 775 n.39 (1947).
47. The Osmond rationale was in accord with the holding of a similar case de-
cided earlier that same year, Forrest Harmon & Co. v. Rottgering, 106 F. Supp.
993 (W.D. Ky. 1952). In denying petitioner's request for a temporary restraining
order, the court said:
[All that is sought is restraint of the effectiveness of an administrative
agency order reducing the rents until all administrative remedies within
the agency can be exhausted.
It is manifest that there does exist the differentiation pointed out by
the plaintiff in the procedure in cases cited by defendant from the proce-
dural situation encountered here. But it seems obvious from a careful con-
sideration of the opinions of the Supreme Court that no judicial relief from
threatened injury may be granted, unless and until the prescribed adminis-
trative remedies have been exhausted. Id. at 995.
Professor Davis appears to accept the Osmond result. See DAvis § 20.05.
48. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit did not adopt the district
court's approach in Wettre v. Hague, 74 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mass. 1947), rev'd on
other grounds, 168 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1948), wherein the court interpreted section
10(d) of the APA as specifically authorizing such relief in appropriate cases.
49. 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948), petition for cert. dismissed, 336 U.S. 908
(1949) (on motion of petitioner).
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steamship company from putting rate reductions into effect pend-
ing a decision before the Commission as to the legality of the reduc-
tion. In rejecting the defendant's argument that the district court
lacked the power to issue such an injunction, the Second Circuit em-
phasized that the stay, which was at the request of the agency itself,
was not in derogation of the administrative process but rather in as-
sistance of that processY0 Citing West India Fruit as authority,
the district court in Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States 1 granted interim
relief to a steamship company which sought a temporary injunction
to prevent implementation of a competitor's rate-fixing agreements
pending a final decision by the United States Maritime Commission
as to the legality of the agreements. (The Commission had already
given temporary approval of the agreements, and had authorized
their implementation until a final Commission review.)52  In so do-
ing, the court found an "equitable power. . . to preserve the status
quo to protect the rights of all concerned," unless such power has
been specifically withdrawn by statute 53  Similarly, in Reeber v.
Rossell,54 the court dealt with the propriety of the issuance of in-
50. The court stressed that the district court had been asked to assist the Com-
mission by preserving the status quo until the Commission could determine whether
it had statutory jurisdiction, and if so, how it should act. Here the Commission
itself lacked the power to grant relief pending its determination. Cf. SEC v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 148 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 324 U.S. 837, judg-
ment vacated as moot, 325 U.S. 833 (1945). This decision has been strongly
criticized, see JAFFE 672-74, and the Second Circuit in West India Fruit felt con-
strained to observe that "[t]his court as at present constituted does not agree
with that decision." 170 F.2d at 779.
51. 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
52. In almost identical circumstances, the District of Columbia Circuit granted
similar relief to the petitioner who sought an injunction of the Federal Maritime
Board's interim approval of a dual-rate system pending a formal hearing. The re-
lief was justified on the grounds that the interim approval constituted a "final
order" by the Board and hence was reviewable. Although temporary, the Board's
approval imposed real, immediate and incalculable harm upon the petitioner. Is-
brandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
990 (1954). The two cases illustrate clearly that where the maintenance of the
status quo necessitates the temporary enjoining of agency action, such injunction
may be issued only to prevent irreparable -injury. But as the second Isbrandtsen
case makes clear, if the "preliminary" order is such as to cause irreparable harm,
it is a final order and accordingly reviewable. The administrative process vis-a-vis
the alleged grievance has been exhausted. Thus, in such situations relief may be
justified either as preserving the status quo to prevent irreparable injury or as re-
viewing a "final" agency order. See Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871, 875 n.12
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
53. Isbrandsten Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
54. 91 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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terim relief to a dismissed federal employee pending his appeal to the
Civil Service Commission. 55 In granting such relief, the court re-
affirmed its previous assertions of an equitable power to maintain
the status quo, citing both its earlier opinion in Isbrandtsen and the
Second Circuit's West India Fruit decision.56 Subsequent cases de-
cided in the Second Circuit have continued to recognize judicial
power to maintain the status quo pending final agency action.5 7
However, in determining the propriety of the exercise of the power,
these courts often justified a denial with language indicating that in-
terim relief was an exception to the exhaustion doctrine, to be granted
only in the presence of unusual circumstances. 58 Such language il-
55. Compare Wettre v. Hague, 74 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mass. 1947), rev'd on other
grounds, 168 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1948) (since exhaustion was not necessary, mer-
its could be adjudicated by the court). Wettre involved a similar factual situation,
but the court based its finding of the power to grant interim relief upon its interpre-
tation of section 10(d) of the APA. Plaintiff-veterans alleged that they were about
to be demoted by the Navy Department in violation of their rights under the Veter-
ans' Preference Act. They asked the district court to enjoin the defendants from dis-
turbing the status quo pending a final decision by the Civil Service Commission. The
district court read section 10(d) as authorizing the grant of interim relief, al-
though the requested relief was denied since there was no finding of irreparable
injury:
If plaintiffs plan to raise before the Commission and eventually, if
necessary, before the courts an issue of the type embraced in subsections
(1), (2), (3) or (4) of § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act...
there would be power in this court "to the extent necessary to prevent ir-
reparable injury. . . to postpone the effective date" of the proposed demo-
tions and to preserve the status of plaintiffs pending conclusion of the ad-
ministrative and judicial review proceedings . . . . But I can not find
that plaintiffs run the risk of serious irreparable injury of the type con-
templated by the quoted statutory language. 74 F. Supp. at 400.
56. 91 F. Supp. at 113. In referring to West India Fruit & Steamship Co. v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948), the court rejected the argument
that the decision rested upon the request of the agency for the issuance of the
injunction:
While it is true that the administrative agency sought the injunction
on behalf of one of the parties in that case, the decision established the
power of the Court to issue an injunction to prevent undue harm pending
an administrative proceeding. The power should not be conditioned upon
the granting or withholding of the approval of the administrative body.
91 F. Supp. at 113.
57. Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); United States Trucking Corp.
v. American Export Lines, 146 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Akelmacker v. Kelly,
101 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Leeds v. Rossell, 101 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
58. In Leeds v. Rossell, 101 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), the court denied
the requested interim relief, stating, correctly but rather imprecisely, that such relief
was granted only in "unusual circumstances" (which were neither enumerated nor
illustrated). Id. at 484. The district court cited as authority two cases, Aircraft &
Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1946); Breiner v. Wallin, 79 F. Supp.
506 (E.D. Pa. 1948), both of which did not deny interim relief but denied adjudica-
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lustrated the still lingering confusion concerning the proper applica-
tion of each doctrine and left a yet more muddled path for future
courts to follow.
In the years since West India Fruit and Reeber, judicial ac-
ceptance of the power of granting interim relief to maintain the status
quo has become more widespread.59 It appears that the Avon-
Osmond theory of denying interim relief on the basis of failure
to exhaust has been largely discredited, nevertheless it has never been
expressly overruled and appears to have retained at least limited vi-
ability.60
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly answered the
question, language in at least two cases implies the existence of ju-
dicial power to grant interim relief to maintain the status quo pend-
ing an administrative decision. 61  The Court apparently equates in-
tion on the merits. But compare United States Trucking Corp. v. American Export
Lines, 146 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), a case in the same district which clearly
articulated the distinction between relief to maintain the status quo and an adjudi-
cation of the merits.
59. The granting of interim relief to maintain the status quo pending admin-
istrative action-most fully developed, if not initiated, by the Second Circuit-
was utilized in other circuits, which often cited Second Circuit decisions in justi-
fying such holdings. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F.2d
242 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (a bond redemption and proposed di~idend payment were
enjoined at the request of the Public Utilities Commission pending an investigation
by the Commission of the legality of such action); Pennsylvania Motor Truck
Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n, 183 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa.
1960) (conference agreements were enjoined pending administrative proceedings be-
fore the Federal Maritime Board to determine their legality). For cases dealing
with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act which recognize the power to
grant interim relief, see United States v. Brown, 217 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1963);
United States v. Guimond Farms, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1962); United
States v. Ideal Farms, 162 F. Supp. 28 (D.NJ. 1958); United States v. Lehigh Val-
ley Cooperative Farmers, 161 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Pa. 1957). More recent cases
recognizing judicial power to grant injunctive relief to maintain the status quo pend-
ing administrative action include Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chaffee, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Brawner Bldg., Inc. v. Shehyn, 442 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965); Scarpa v. Smith, 294 F.
Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Justus v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Cal. 1965);
Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
60. See Johnson v. Postmaster General, 330 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Md. 1971);
DAvis § 20.05.
61. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1965); Arrow Transp. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22 (1963). The Court in Dean further ob.
served that power to review agency decisions "includes the traditional power to is-
sue injunctions to preserve the status quo while administrative proceedings are in
progress and prevent impairment of the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction."
384 U.S. at 604.
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terim relief with the power to grant similar relief pending judicial
review and describes both as "merely incidental to the courts' juris-
diction to review final agency action,"'62 since each serves to protect
the courts' potential jurisdiction by ensuring that judicial review will
be effective. While dicta, the Supreme Court's language strongly
indicates a recognition of the existence of such power and tacit
approval of the approach adopted in both West India Fruit and
Reeber.63
Distinction Between Exhaustion and Interim Relief. The dis-
tinction between the doctrine of exhaustion and that of interim relief
is clearest when a party asks not for a determination of his griev-
ance on the merits but rather merely seeks maintenance of the status
quo pending an ultimate determination by the agency. 64 In such an
instance, the petitioner simply attempts to invoke the aid of the court
to prevent irreparable injury which results from changing circum-
stances during the pendency of the administrative process. Such
interim relief is not the judicial interference with prescribed admin-
istrative procedure that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to pre-
vent,13 but instead providing interim relief aids the effectiveness of
the final agency decision by insuring that the impact of the decision
will not be impaired by a previously irreparable change in the status
of the parties.66
The distinction becomes factually and legally more difficult,
however, when the seeking of interim relief is compared not with
premature judicial review of the merits of the ultimate question be-
fore the agency, but rather with judicial review of an interlocutory
agency decision. The rationale supporting exhaustion requires not
merely the initiation but the completion of available administrative
62. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1965), quoting Arrow Transp.
Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22 (1963).
63. Two cases, West India Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170
F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948); Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950), both of which allowed interim
relief at the agency's request, were cited in Arrow Transp. Co. 372 U.S. at 671
n.22.
64. E.g., Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
65. See notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text.
66. This is especially true where the administrative agency has no power it-
self to preserve the status quo while it is making its determination. See, e.g.,
Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972); West India Fruit & Steamship
Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948); Isbrandsten Co. v. United
States, 81 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y, 1948).
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remedies.67  Accordingly, it might appear that only "final," rather
than interlocutory, agency decisions should be subject to judicial
review. 68 Thus, an apparent conflict arises between the two doc-
trines where an administrative agency has the power to grant the
interim relief requested-maintenance of the status quo-but re-
fuses to do so.69 In such a situation, the judicial exercise of equi-
table power to grant interim relief would be, in effect, only a review
of the agency's refusal to maintain the status quo. The exhaustion
doctrine, then, is designed to allow the administrative agency to ful-
fill its congressionally defined responsibilities free from judicial in-
terference. On the other hand, interim relief is justified on the same
basis as the power of the court to stay administrative action pending
judicial review-to protect the courts' jurisdiction by ensuring that
ultimate review will be meaningful and not rendered wholly or
partially nugatory by previously incurred irreparable injury.
Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine. Two recent cases pro-
vide an opportunity to examine this distinction and a basis for
67. See note 81 infra.
68. As has been noted, see note 52 supra, certain technically "intermediate"
or "interlocutory" decisions may have such an immediate and adverse effect on a
party so as to be considered "final" for review purposes. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United
States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Moreover, the general rule has been formu-
lated that a party may bypass established administrative review procedures where
the issue in question cannot be raised from a later order of the agency. Further
exhaustion is not required because vis-a-vis the particular question in controversy
there are no available administrative remedies to pursue. See Bannercraft Clothing
Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the court
held that a district court's enjoining of administrative proceedings pending a ju-
dicial determination of the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act to
documents involved in those proceedings did not contravene the requirements of
the exhaustion doctrine. A technically interlocutory decision of an administrative
agency (the Regional Renegotiation Board) not to release certain documents to a
contractor contesting an excess profits determination was held to be reviewable,
although the petitioner was concededly at the beginning of a "labyrinthine system"
of administrative review. Id. at 350. But exhaustion was not required since the
prescribed administrative remedies "would not prevent the irreparable injury which
the contractors fear." Id. at 357.
"Since appellees will not be able to assert a Freedom of Information Act viola-
tion on appeal from the Renegotiation Board decision, they must assert it now if they
are to do so at all. It follows that their remedy at law is inadequate and that the
traditional prerequisites for equitable intervention have been satisfied." Id. at 359.
See note 81 infra. Cf. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FrC, 469 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1972).
See also Jewel Companies, Inc. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970); Elmo Div.
of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
69. See, e.g., Osmond v. Riverdale Manor, Inc., 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952);
Avon-Dairy Co. v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
[Vol. 1973:157
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1972
resolving the problem of which doctrine applies in a given factual con-
text. PepsiCo, Inc. v. FTC70 illustrates the application of the ex-
haustion requirement to a request for judicial review of an interloc-
utory agency decision. In PepsiCo, the Second Circuit held that the
Federal Trade Commission's denial of a motion to dismiss a proceed-
ing brought against a soft drink manufacturer-who allegedly was
engaged in unfair methods of competition-for nonjoinder of indi-
vidual bottlers was not a final order reviewable by federal courts
prior to exhaustion of the prescribed administrative procedure. The
FTC had instituted proceedings against PepsiCo and other soft drink
manufacturers, alleging unfair methods of competition in violation
of provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.7 The com-
plaint challenged the validity of exclusive bottling agreements be-
tween the soft drink manufacturer and its franchised bottlers whereby
individual bottlers had agreed not to sell outside of their designated
territories. In its answer, PepsiCo asserted that the complaint was
fatally defective for failure to join the bottlers who had entered
into the challenged agreements as indispensable parties-thereby,
PepsiCo charged the FTC with ignoring both the property and pro-
cedural rights of the bottlers, whose economic interests would be
most directly and adversely affected by the invalidation of the ex-
clusive franchises.7 2  The FTC hearing examiner denied PepsiCo's
motion to dismiss, although he did permit intervention by three in-
dividual bottlers and the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association. After
PepsiCo's subsequent appeal of this motion to the Commission was
denied, it instituted an action in the district court to enjoin the FTC
from continuing the proceeding absent joinder of all the bottlers. The
district court granted the FTC's motion to dismiss and held that it
had no jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory order of the FTC be-
cause the plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative remedies. 73
PepsiCo and an intervening bottler appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling.
Although the Federal Trade Commission Act specifically limits
70. 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3449 (U.S. Feb. 20,
1973), affg 343 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y.). See also Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, No.
72-2270 (5th Cir., Feb. 15, 1973), a!f'g 342 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga.) (several
similar complaints were filed against major manufacturers of soft drink syrups).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
72. The primary reason given for the denial was that, as a practical matter, an
attempt to join all of the bottlers as parties would create an unmanageable situation
for trial purposes. 472 F.2d at 183.
73. PepsiCo, Inc. v. FTC, 343 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the review of a court of appeals to FTC cease and desist orders,7 '
the court viewed this limitation as a mere prohibition against ap-
pellate review of interlocutory orders and not as absolutely preclud-
ing review by suit originally in a district court.75  However, since
the order in question was not one made expressly reviewable by stat-
ute, reviewability was to be determined by whether the order con-
stituted "final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court."'76  After reviewing the Supreme Court cases
where exhaustion of administrative procedure was not required, 77 the
appellate court enunciated a test for determining whether final
agency action can be said to have occurred. Under the Second Cir-
cuit's formulation, if an administrative agency refused to dismiss a
proceeding which is either plainly beyond its jursidiction as a matter
of law78 or is being conducted in a manner that cannot result in a
valid order, then the asserted error will be immediately reviewable. 7'
However, the court held that the case did not fall within the above
stated exception, finding that the bottlers were not indispensable
parties to a valid cease and desist order.80 Thus, PepsiCo was un-
74. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
75. 472 F.2d at 185; see Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342, 344
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
76. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). Although
the Second Circuit opinion was couched in terms of the "final judgment" rule, such
an analysis is, as has been noted, merely an adjunct to the exhaustion doctrine, since
if the agency action complained of be deemed "final," a fortiori there are no fur-
ther administrative remedies to exhaust.
77. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
78. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
79. The court accepts this latter qualification upon the normal requirements
"for the sake of argument," terming it "possibly over-generous." 472 F.2d at 187.
See American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962);
Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(holding that orders denying intervention in administrative proceedings are im.
mediately appealable in circumstances where erroneous denial might invalidate any
future order). This suggested exception to the exhaustion requirement would ap-
pear to be merely the application of the Leedom exception (as to patently unau-
thorized jurisdictional assertions) to the area of administrative procedure, i.e., pro-
cedural errors which are of a "summa" or "magna" quality. See note 17 supra.
80. In so finding, the court held that an agency proceeding seeking to vindi-
cate public rights against a respondent could determine the private rights of other
parties if such parties were given notice and an opportunity to intervene. 472 F.2d
at 188-90. PepsiCo had argued strongly that unless all the bottlers were joined, com-
pliance with an eventual cease and desist order might subject PepsiCo to liability in
a suit by an unjoined bottler whose territory had been violated by another to
whom PepsiCo had sold syrup-an act in derogation of the exclusive franchise
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able to show either (1) irreparable injury which the prescribed ad-
ministrative review procedure would be inadequate to prevent (since
the issue in dispute would be subject to effective review by a court of
appeals following a cease and desist order) which would in turn ful-
fill the requirements of exhaustion, or (2) an agency error sufficiently
egregious as to fall within the previously delineated exceptions to ex-
haustion. Accordingly, PepsiCo illustrates the proper refusal of a
court to decide the merits of an agency decision prior to the exhaustion
of the administrative procedure."
agreements to which PepsiCo was a party. The court dismissed the argument
summarily:
The proposition that a court would hold one person liable to an-
other for doing something within the United States which a federal ad-
ministrative agency, acting within its jurisdiction, has found to be neces-
sary for the enforcement of a federal statute arouses some astonishment.
This is particularly so in a context where the persons who would seek to
enforce liability know of the proceeding and have had an opportunity to
intervene before the agency "in order to safeguard their interests." Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 234 (1938). The aston-
ishment becomes greater in light of the Supreme Court's clear statement
in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 363 (1940), that, in
administrative proceedings devoted "to the protection and enforcement
of public rights, there is little scope for the traditional rules governing
the joinder of parties in litigation determining private rights . . . " Id. at
187-88.
In Coca-Cola v. FrC, No. 72-2270 (5th Cir., Feb. 15, 1973), the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected a similar argument, where the petitioners had also contended that it
would be a denial of the due process rights of the non-joined bottlers to determine
the validity of the bottlers' franchises without joining them as parties.
81. As observed above, see note 76 supra, the court analyzed the problem, not
in terms of "exhaustion," but whether the FTC decision was final under § 10(c) of
the APA. The result does not differ, since the final judgment rule is merely a
necessary and logically harmonious corollary to the exhaustion doctrine. See note
68 supra. However, the court, while correctly noting the lack of consistency in
prior exhaustion cases, feels the reason for such confusion lies in the failure of
the courts to address themselves to "the crucial issue"--the proper interpretation
of final agency action under section 10(c). While this rationale might have some
merit, the following footnote by the court reveals a lack of perception regarding the
logic of the exhaustion doctrine and corresponding failure to grasp the requirements
of the doctrine:
The courts speak of "exhaustion." This case shows how little help
that term offers in the context here relevant. If the rule is simply that
plaintiff must have "exhausted" administrative remedies with respect to
the issue for which judicial review is sought, as he clearly must, PepsiCo
has done that. 472 F.2d at 186 n.7.
The above passage demonstrates a lack of understanding of the purposes of exhaus-
tion, for the doctrine seeks to require the party to follow the prescribed adminis-
trative procedure. It demands completion and not merely initiation of such re-
view procedures. In the present case, PepsiCo will be able to raise on appellate re-
view the issue of the indispensability of the bottlers. Any non-joined bottlers
could seek review in a district court as a party aggrieved by any order forthcoming
from the Commission. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). If the reviewing court finds against
the FTC, the order would be invalid, and the FTC would be required to join the bot-
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Application of Interim Relief. The distinction between the ju-
dicial power to grant interim relief and the requirements of the ex-
haustion doctrine was more clearly drawn in Murray v. Kunzig,82
which reasserted the power of the courts to grant interim injunctive
relief to maintain the status quo pending final agency action. In
Murray, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
district court has jurisdiction to grant interim relief to prevent the dis-
charge of a probationary federal employee whose appeal challeng-
ing the discharge was pending before the Civil Service Commission.
The plaintiff, who was a probationary employee of the Public Build-
ings Service of the General Services Administration, had received
written notice terminating her employment. Thereafter, she filed
an appeal of her discharge with the Civil Service Commission, alleg-
ing that the discharge was invalid because, inter alia, it was based
on conduct which had occurred in part prior to her employment
with the GSA; therefore, she had been denied the additional rights
which were statutorily appurtenant to a discharge on such grounds."3
tIers in any new proceedings it might institute. This is the prescribed statutory path
of review; this is what exhaustion requires. If the FTC order had been found to
be a "final agency action," it would be reviewable under the APA; however, this
is not in contradiction but rather in accordance with the exhaustion doctrine. In
PepsiCo, judicial review at the conclusion of the administrative process would have
been an adequate remedy for the harm alleged. It is true that PepsiCo would have
been subjected to a needless hearing, but the expense and burden of litigation is not
the type of irreparable injury which allows the circumvention of the exhaustion
requirement. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938);
Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938).
It is only where adherence to the prescribed administrative procedure will afford no
meaningful relief for the harm alleged that the aggrieved party will be allowed
immediate recourse to the courts. This is final agency action, because it inflicts
harm for which there is no available administrative remedy to exhaust vis-a-vis
the harm alleged. Thus, the logic of the final agency action requirement of § 10(c)
of the APA is completely consistent with a proper application of the exhaustion doc-
trine.
82. 462 F.2d 871, rehearing denied, 462 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (opinion
rendered), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1973).
83. Under applicable regulations, when a probationary employee is terminated
for conduct during his probationary period, the agency is simply required to give
him written notice of the effective date of his separation and "the agency's con-
clusions as to the inadequacies of his performance or conduct." 5 C.F.R. § 315,
804 (1972). When the termination is based in whole or in part on conditions aris-
ing before the beginning of employment, the employee must be given advance writ-
ten notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termination and an opportunity
to file a written answer to the notice and to furnish affidavits in support of such
answer. Further, the agency is required to take such answer and affidavits into
account in reaching its final decision on termination. Id. § 315.805.
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Since the Civil Service Commission had no power to order a stay of
the discharge, 4 the plaintiff instituted an action in district court
seeking an injunction to prohibit the GSA from effecting her termi-
nation until the Civil Service Commission had acted on her appeal;
The district court granted the requested relief, finding that unless the
dismissal were enjoined the plaintiff might suffer immediate and irre-
parable injury. 5 The Government appealed on the ground that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction when
an appeal was pending before the Civil Service Commission, essen-
tially suggesting the rationale followed by the Avon-Osmond line of
cases-that is, the exhaustion doctrine prohibits any judicial inter-
vention prior to the completion of the administrative process.8 6 Re-
jecting the Government's argument the court of appeals affirmed the
district court decision.
In holding that the district court's assertion of jurisdiction had
been proper to grant interim relief pending the administrative deci-
sion, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Government's argu-
ment. The court made an extended effort to distinguish between the
issue of the propriety of the court's granting interim relief pending
an administrative determination on the merits 7 where there is no
statutory provision specifically authorizing such relief, and the neces-
sity for the exhaustion of administrative remedies before an adjudica-
tion on the merits. Observing that such interim relief is not the in-
terference with the administrative process that the exhaustion doc-
trine seeks to prevent, 8 the court noted that this type of relief
simply insures that the final agency decision will not be undermined
84. 462 F.2d at 873.
85. Id. at 874.
86. See notes 36-47 supra and accompanying text.
87. The court apparently felt it necessary to reiterate those differences and
issued a relatively lengthy opinion denying the Government's petition for rehear-
ing which simply restated the court's view of interim relief. 462 F.2d at 883-86.
88. The Murray opinion observed the past judicial confusion between the issues
of interim relief and exhaustion. 462 F.2d 871, 874. The confusion originated
in such cases as Avon and Osmond, where the courts felt that any judicial inter-
vention would circumvent the exhaustion requirement. For such courts the type of
relief requested prior to the completion of the administrative process was irrelevant;
it was a distinction without a difference. Although it is unclear whether this view
has been completely discredited, see Johnson v. Postmaster General, 330 F. Supp.
1058, 1060 (D. Md. 1971), there have been numerous instances in recent years of
iudicial recognition of the power of courts to grant interim relief to maintain the
status quo while an administrative decision on the merits is pending. See notes 57,
59 supra.
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or rendered ineffective. 9 Having articulated this distinction, the
court analogized the granting of interim relief pending an administra-
tive decision with the universally conceded power of the courts to
stay administrative decisions pending judicial review, 90 a traditional
equitable power used to preserve the courts' jurisdiction.91 In the
court's view, the determination as to whether such interim relief should
be granted was to be based upon an application of the Virginia Pe-
troleum Jobbers four-point test. 2 Thus, Murray correctly portrayed
interim relief as a complement to the administrative process, not in
contravention with the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine,"
and equated the power to grant such relief with the power to pre-
serve the status quo pending judicial review.
Interim Relief Does Not Contravene Exhaustion. If there is
a valid distinction to be drawn between exhaustion of administrative
remedies and interim relief, it must be shown that the granting of
89. 462 F.2d at 874-75
90. See note 29 supra.
91. See Justice Frankfurter's analysis in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4, 9-11 (1942). See also Administrative Procedure Act § 10(d), 5
U.S.C. § 705 (1970).
92. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. The court in Murray found that
temporary loss of employment may be irreparable harm sufficient to justify interim
relief, even though back pay and full reinstatement would be granted to the em-
ployee upon a successful conclusion of her appeal-one of the four factors in the
Virgnia Petroleum Jobbers test. The court observed that the inability to meet on-
going financial commitments because of an absence of present wages might well
be irreparable damage. While referring to the four-point formula of Petroleum
Jobbers for determining whether a stay should be issued in a particular case, the
court appears to require a threshold showing of the posssibility of irreparable in-
jury as a prerequisite for district court jurisdiction to grant the interim relief sought.
The court also noted the statement of Justice Frankfurter that "[a] stay is not a
matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant.
It is an exercise of judicial discretion. The propriety of its issue is dependent upon
the circumstances of the particular case." 462 F.2d at 876-77, quoting Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10-11 (1942). However, the rationale
for interim relief seems to require that prior to the exercise of such discretion
"it must be shown that there is a possibility of irreparable harm." Id. at 877.
93. Judge Robb in his dissenting opinion, 462 F.2d at 880-81, rejects this analy-
sis and contends that the application of the doctrine of exhaustion is not limited
to cases in which judicial relief on the merits is sought, citing two cases, Aircraft
& Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Osmond v. Riverdale Manor,
Inc., 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952). But see Settle v. Brown, 345 F. Supp. 405
(S.D. Tex. 1972), a case where interim relief was sought to enjoin temporarily the
dismissal of a federal employee. There the court specifically adopted the reasoning
of the majority in Murray, noting that "exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
a real issue where a plaintiff seeks interim relief pending an administrative deter-
mination on the merits." Id. at 407.
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interim relief to maintain the status quo pending an agency deci-
sion does not contravene the logic underlying the exhaustion doc-
trine. To justify such interim relief on the basis that the litigant is
not asking the court to adjudicate the merits of the proceeding pend-
ing before the agency is insufficient. The petitioner in PepsiCo
was not suggesting that the district court resolve the ultimate issue
under consideration by the FTC-the legality of the exclusive
franchise agreements; neither, of course, was the employee in Mur-
ray contending that the district court should immediately review the
merits of her claim of improper dismissal. Thus, neither plaintiff
was seeking an adjudication on the merits; both were willing to ex-
haust the prescribed administrative remedies as to the ultimate ques-
tion before the respective agencies. Yet each was dissatisfied with
an intermediate aspect of the proceedings and sought relief only from
allegedly irreparable injury arising from that aspect of the adminis-
trative proceedings.
The basis for distinguishing the two cases lies in the nature of
the injury alleged and the type of relief requested. In PepsiCo,
the plaintiff objected to an agency procedural decision and sought
immediate judicial review of the agency determination of that pro-
cedural issue. The court quite properly held that, since the griev-
ance of which PepsiCo had complained would be subject to judicial
review following any FTC order arising from the hearing in question,
the plaintiff would be required to exhaust the prescribed adminisitra-
tive procedure.94 Thus, where the question raised by a party will be
subject to meaningful review by either the agency or the courts dur-
ing the course of the prescribed statutory procedure, the party will not
be allowed immediate access to the courts unless the facts of his case
fall within one of the established exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.
In Murray, the plaintiff asked for judicial maintenance of the status
quo to protect her from irreparable injury while the administrative
decision was pending. In holding that the district court had jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief, the court of appeals observed that the Civil
Service Commission had no power to order a stay of the employee's
discharge.95 While this fact lends support to the court's conten-
tion that the granting of interim relief is not interference with the
94. If PepsiCo had been able to show that the technically "interlocutory" ad-
ministrative decision had such an immediate adverse effect as to inflict irreparable
damage, the decision could have been reviewed as a "final agency action." See
note 81 supra.
95. 462 F.2d at 873.
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administrative process and thus not in contravention of the rationale
for the exhaustion doctrine, it is also clear that a court may grant
interim relief to maintain the status quo without contravening the
exhaustion doctrine even where the agency has the power to grant such
relief and has declined to exercise it. 6 Admittedly, if the adminis-
trative agency in Murray had possessed the power to maintain the
status quo, access to the district court would have been denied until
the employee had sought and been denied the requested relief from
the Commission; 97 however, the district court would then have had
the power to grant such relief. In each situation the relief would
be justified as a protection of potential judicial review jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, the issuance of relief in the latter situation is no
more in contravention of the exhaustion doctrine than in the former.
CONCLUSION
Where an agency has no power to grant interim relief in order
to maintain the status quo and thus prevent irreparable damage while
the final outcome of the administrative determination is uncertain, the
available administrative remedies have been exhausted. Likewise,
where the administrative agency has declined to exercise its power
to grant interim relief to prevent irreparable injury, the petitioner
has no further administrative remedies to exhaust vis-a-vis the harm
alleged.98 The exhaustion doctrine implies that there must be an
available administrative procedure to be followed. If there is none,
it is no violation of the exhaustion doctrine for a party to seek relief
in a district court.9 The Supreme Court has termed the power of a
court to stay administrative action pending judicial review as part of
96. See, e.g., Osmond v. Riverdale Manor, Inc., 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952);
Avon-Dairy Co. v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
97. Cf. Ensey v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1972).
98. See Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871, 875 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
99. If the denial of interim relief could be shown to cause substantial irrepar-
able damage, the decision could be subject to immediate judicial review on the
ground that as to the harm alleged the administrative remedies have been exhausted,
and thus the denial of interim relief was a final agency action subject to immediate
judicial review under section 10(c) of the APA. Jaffe contends that the granting
of interim relief in such situations contravenes neither the exhaustion doctrine nor
section 10(c) of the APA since the petitioner is not seeking review of the agency's
denial of interim relief but rather is asking the court to issue its own relief. JAFFn
668 n.70. This distinction is important, since in the latter situation the court
would be less constrained to defer to the previous agency findings as to the pro-
priety of granting the interim relief, presumably according to the Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers test. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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the courts' traditional equitable powers, justified as a means of protect-
ing the courts' jurisdiction."'0 As stated, a court should not require
exhaustion of administrative procedure if such procedure offers no
meaningful remedy for the harm asserted. Immediate review should
be granted, whether justified in terms of a final agency action or in
completion of exhaustion, since the harm alleged, by definition, will
not be subject to meaningful review at a later time. Thus, in such
a case, by granting immediate review the court is protecting its juris-
diction (or that of the court system as a whole). Seen in this light
it becomes apparent that the granting of interim relief to maintain the
status quo pending the administrative decision likewise serves to pro-
tect the courts' jurisdiction, and can be justified as part of a court's
traditional equitable powers when not specifically authorized by stat-
ute. In sum, the requirements of exhaustion preclude immediate
recourse to the courts for an adjudication of the merits of either the
ultimate issue facing the administrative agency or an interlocutory
agency decision, unless the factual circumstances of the case are
such as to bring it within one of the recognized exceptions to the ex-
haustion doctrine. 10 1 However, a technically interlocutory decision
may have such an immediate and adverse effect as to be a "final
agency action" reviewable under section 10(c) of the APA. More-
over, where a plaintiff seeks interim relief to maintain the status quo
pending a final administrative determination, the district court has the
power to grant such relief in appropriate cases to prevent irrepar-
able injury.10 2
Although the power to grant interim relief pending a final ad-
ministrative determination has been specifically recognized in several
circuits,' and its existence has been strongly implied by the Supreme
Court, ' 4 other courts have not accepted the doctrine.'0 5 Such
courts have justified their holdings on the grounds that the granting
100. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942).
101. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text.
102. If the decision is deemed "final," the exhaustion requirement has been
fulfilled. See note 81 supra.
103. Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schwartz v. Covington,
341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965); West India Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948).
104. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1966); Arrow Transp. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22 (1963).
105. Osmond v. Riverdale Manor, Inc., 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952); Johnson
v. Postmaster General, 330 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Md. 1971). See also Murray v.
Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871, 880-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
Vol. 1973:157]
300 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1973:157
of interim relief to maintain the status quo circumvents the require-
ment of exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, an analy-
sis of the logic of the exhaustion doctrine inexorably leads to the con-
clusion that where the administrative agency has no power to main-
tain the status quo while its final opinion on the merits is still pend-
ing, or has declined to exercise the power, the granting of such relief
in such cases as meet the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers guidelines does
not contravene the requirement that one exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to seeking judicial relief.
